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We conduct an event analysis on OPEC quota announcements to determine their impact
on the stock returns in the oil industry. We ¯nd that announcements to reduce the quota are
followed by positive excess returns over pre-announcement levels, announcements of no action
are met with negative excess returns and announcements to increase the quota have no signi¯cant
impact on stock market returns. This suggests that there is an asymmetric ability on the part of
OPEC to secure agreements. In particular, when demand has increased, agreements are easily
forthcoming, while when times are bad the probability of a disagreement is substantially higher.
We present further empirical as well as anecdotal evidence to support our interpretation. Finally,
we present two simple models of asymmetric information which make predictions consistent
with our empirical ¯ndings. In the ¯rst model, disagreements arise due to a perceived lack of
commitment to the agreed upon quota due to the possibility of random shocks. The second
model takes a behavioural approach; in particular, disagreements arise because players place
more emphasis on their individual quotas than strict pro¯t maximisation dictates.
JEL Classi¯cation: D70, D82, L13, L71
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1 Introduction
A number of papers, dating from Gri±n [1985] to Ramcharran [2002] have tried to describe
OPEC behaviour according to one of four competing hypotheses | a competitive model, a
cartel model, a target revenue model or a property rights model. For the most part, these
studies use OPEC production data to estimate a supply curve for OPEC oil. For example,
support is given to the cartel model if a negative relationship is found between price and OPEC
production, indicating a backward bending supply curve. Both the economics and politics of oil
are much in the news lately, and given the continued importance that oil has in our economy, it is
important to understand the behaviour of OPEC | in particular, what motivates its decisions.
The present paper strays from much of the previous literature examining OPEC. There is
less to be gained from another study estimating the supply curves of OPEC members than other
approaches. We take for granted that OPEC is a cartel that seeks to in°uence oil prices for the
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1bene¯ts of its members. However, we take seriously the fact that OPEC is not a monolithic body,
but rather a collection of diverse interests which must negotiate any changes to its production
schedule. To this end, there is much to be learned about OPEC through their announced
decisions. We may then study how markets react to such announcements made by OPEC to
glean relevant information about OPEC's decision-making capabilities. However, one will not
¯nd OPEC listed on any stock market. Therefore, in order to conduct such an analysis, we rely
on the close relationship between OPEC and various groups of oil companies. We conduct an
event study to analyse the impact that OPEC announcements have on the stock market returns
of certain groups of oil companies. As is standard in event studies, we measure the impact
of announcements by examining the pattern of abnormal returns in the days surrounding each
event. More speci¯cally, we divide OPEC announcements into three classes: (1) increases in the
quota, (2) decreases in the quota and (3) no change in the quota. We then examine how the stock
market indices of oil industry groups respond to each class of announcement. Upon presenting
the results, we argue that they o®er us interesting insights into the behaviour of OPEC and
their decision-making apparatus | as the title of the paper suggests, we ¯nd evidence that the
status quo is given extra signi¯cance in certain states of the world.
The paper presents two key results. Our ¯rst result is something of a negative result. In
particular, we ¯nd no evidence of abnormal returns, either positive or negative, when OPEC
announces an increase in the quota. Our second result is that signi¯cant abnormal returns
do accrue following both status quo announcements and announcements of reductions in the
quota. However, matters are not so simple. In the case of status quo announcements, we ¯nd
signi¯cantly negative abnormal returns, while for quota reductions we ¯nd signi¯cantly positive
abnormal returns. These results immediately suggest that the market is surprised by status
quo announcements and quota reductions, but not by announcements of increases in the quota.
Both of these results are quite consistent across the four sub-sectors of the oil industry that
we consider.1 However, why should status quo announcements lead to negative returns, while
reductions lead to positive excess returns?
As we have said, our examination of OPEC behaviour is indirect, relying on an as yet unex-
plained relationship between OPEC and Western oil companies. Therefore, to put the results in
the correct context and begin providing answers, we must explain this relationship. Of course
all oil companies2 are signi¯cantly dependent on the price of oil for their pro¯tability. Thus by
adjusting its production in an attempt to in°uence oil prices, OPEC a®ects the pro¯tability of
these oil companies. In particular, any action taken by OPEC that leads to higher revenues
for it should be positively correlated with the pro¯tability of oil companies. This relationship
becomes even stronger if the company in question has operations in an OPEC-member country.
This is because the typical arrangement between the two is rather similar to sharecropping.3
Thus, if OPEC acts in a way to increase its pro¯ts, it should also increase the pro¯ts of the
companies.
Let us consider the implications for each of the three possible announcements. To begin, con-
sider status quo announcements; one can imagine three possible reasons for such announcement.
First, neither demand nor supply conditions have changed substantially to require a change in
production. This should not lead to any excess returns, positive or negative. Second, perhaps
demand has gone up substantially so that production should be increased. Given the apparent
positive correlation between oil prices and stock market returns, such a status quo announcement
would surely lead to positive excess returns. Finally, perhaps demand has decreased so that the
1In particular, we conduct our event study on stock market indices for (1) the oil industry as a whole, (2)
exploration and production companies, (3) service companies and (4) integrated oil companies.
2Speci¯cally, those which drill, produce and/or explore for crude oil. Re¯ners or integrated companies with re¯ning
operations relying signi¯cantly on purchased oil will have a rather di®erent relationship with OPEC.
3For example, Chevron-Texaco holds a 40 percent interest in oil ¯elds o®shore the Niger Delta. They note, \In
addition, the Nigerian government levies taxes and royalties on Chevron's revenues and oil production, such that
total Nigerian revenue from the partnership exceeds 85 percent. This is typical of overseas oil operations in which
the government is the primary partner."
2quota should be reduced. In this case a status quo announcement would lead to negative excess
returns. But there is even more to consider. We should not witness any excess returns unless
the market is taken by surprise by the announcement. Therefore, our result regarding status
quo announcements indicates two things. First, status quo announcements are a surprise to the
market and, second, they generally occur in periods of weak or falling demand.
Now consider announcements to reduce the quota. Our result is that these lead to positive
abnormal returns. First, as above, given the presence of any abnormal returns, this must imply
that the market is surprised by such announcements. Second, the fact that these excess returns
are positive means that such announcements are typically also made during periods of weak or
falling demand. In this case, any action by OPEC to raise the price of oil should provide a
positive boost to the pro¯tability of the oil companies we consider. Finally, consider announce-
ments to increase the quota. Here we do not ¯nd any evidence of excess returns, either positive
or negative. This suggests that the stock market accurately predicts such announcements and
is not surprised when they ¯nally come about.
Return now to the big picture and consider our empirical results as a whole. They suggest
that we may consider a two state world | one state for good times and one for bad times.
Our result of no excess returns suggests that agreements are easily forthcoming in the good
state of the world. In contrast our dual result of negative abnormal returns following status quo
announcements and positive abnormal returns following reductions indicates greater uncertainty
regarding the probability of agreement in the bad state of the world. That is, suppose that
demand has decreased so that the pro¯table thing for OPEC to do is lower the overall quota.
The market sees the negative demand shock and then forms expectations on whether or not
OPEC will agree to a reduction; however, these expectations are held more tentatively than in
the case where demand has increased. Thus when the announcement is made, the market reacts
to either outcome and abnormal returns of the kind we have discussed are likely to occur.
At a more abstract level, we have a situation in which a group of agents interact repeatedly
through time in a constantly changing environment. Furthermore, their interaction is such that
the probability of agreement is asymmetric with respect to the observed movement in demand.
Our OPEC study provokes a more general theoretical point. Suppose that a group of agents
is repeatedly attempting to write binding agreements in a constantly changing environment. It
appears that improvements in the environment are more conducive to agreement: individual
agents are happy enough with the improvement per se that they do not ¯ght too hard over the
precise division of the surplus. In contrast, a deterioration in the environment, one that calls
for belt-tightening all around, will cause a greater outcry as agents are more inclined to contest
the exact terms of the reduction.4 Our analysis can be seen as providing substantive support
for this sort of behaviour.
Standard theory, or variations thereof, do not seem to do very well in explaining this phe-
nomenon. Indeed, when confronted with a situation such as the one we have described, one is
immediately drawn to the works of Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Haltiwanger and Har-
rington [1991] as a potential explanation. These studies concluded that the maximal amount
of sustainable collusion must vary over the business cycle. To see this, consider the iid demand
case of Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] in which ¯rms are Bertrand Competitors. Suppose that
demand is high and the cartel seeks to implement the monopoly price. In this situation, the
gain from undercutting the monopoly price is very high, and in fact, increasing with demand.
Furthermore, next period demand is expected to be lower and so the punishments available to
prevent deviations are weaker. Thus full collusion may not be possible when demand is high.
However, as we will argue below, one cannot apply these authors' results. Neither model gener-
ates equilibrium path disagreements. Our results of signi¯cant abnormal returns indicate that
the market is taken by surprise by certain announcements. Therefore, it is clear that any model
without disagreements along the equilibrium path cannot explain completely our results.
What could be at play then which causes agreements to be more likely in good times than in
4For an academic example close to home, think of university budget cuts and the more intense scrutiny these
receive from individual departments, relative to budget expansions.
3bad times? For cartel members to refuse any reduction in their quotas when demand has fallen
but accept an increase in their quota from a similar-sized increase in demand a wedge must be
placed in such a way that there is a trade-o® between the higher pro¯ts of an optimally set,
but reduced, quota and the quota itself. Reference points seem particularly well-suited to this
goal. Indeed, with some care one can write a reference point-based model which is capable of
generating predictions consistent with our empirical ¯ndings and which is similar in spirit to
some ideas found in the psychology and economics literature.5
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we brie°y present the event study method-
ology, while in section 3 we provide the main empirical results and a more detailed interpretation
than we have given thus far. We conclude section 3 with further empirical evidence in favour of
our interpretation. In particular, for each status quo announcement we forecast the two-month
forward price of oil using data up to the month of the OPEC meeting. The results obtained
indicate that prices are predicted to fall, suggesting weak demand. Thus, as argued in our
interpretation, status quo announcements overwhelmingly occur during bad times. In section 4
we take pains to demonstrate two things. First, we provide the results of some statistical tests
which demonstrate that our empirical results are robust. Second, we present some anecdotal
evidence which suggests that, as argued, OPEC ¯nds it much more di±cult to agree during bad
times rather than in good times.6
In section 5 we turn to a more theoretical discussion. After arguing that standard models are
incapable of predicting the appropriate pattern of agreements and disagreements, we present the
¯rst of two simple models which accurately predict our main empirical ¯nding. In this model,
with some probability, a cartel member may experience an adverse shock and lose the ability
to commit not to deviate from the agreed upon quota. However, the cartel can still prevent
deviations from the agreement through punishments which would be enforced upon seeing a
deviation. Therefore, the cartel has two issues about which it must worry. The ¯rst is simply
that it wants to sustain the highest possible level of pro¯ts for its members, while the second is
that it wants to reduce the risk that a cartel member which experienced a shock will actually
deviate. When demand increases it is clear that there is no trade-o® between these two goals.
Increasing the quota will raise the static pro¯ts of the cartel members and will lessen the static
gain to be had from any deviation. In contrast, when demand decreases the cartel faces a
trade-o®. Reducing the quota increases the pro¯ts of the cartel members but also it increases
the gains from a deviation. Therefore, if a cartel member has has strong enough beliefs that
another member of the cartel has experienced a large shock, it will vote against any reduction
in the quota.
We then proceed to a behavioural model which generates similar predictions regarding the
nature of agreements, but which strays further from standard economic models. In the model
considered there, disagreements arise because cartel members attach property rights to their
quotas, so that the quota enters separately into the utility function. Then, following a decrease
in demand, cartel members are willing to sacri¯ce e±ciency for maintaining property rights.
In contrast, when demand increases, there is no tradeo® between e±ciency and property rights
and so agreements can always be implemented. Moreover, by choosing the evolution of property
rights, the model is capable of handling other issues which also seem empirically relevant |
notable among them is the relative status of a cartel member. We ¯nd the intuition developed
in this part of the paper quite attractive and rather more general than the speci¯c example
of OPEC considered here. After contrasting the models of sections 5, section 6 concludes the
paper by arguing that a similar intuition can be found in many other situations such as labour
negotiations. Relevant ¯gures and tables are, for the most part, relegated to appendices.
5We refer the reader to Bazerman [1985], Bazerman and Carroll [1987], Zajac [1995] and to section 5.3 of the
present paper for more details.
6In an appendix we also report the results of a similar event study where we consider the e®ect of the three
announcements on oil prices and on a selection of re¯ners. We also try to eliminate the possibility that the results
are driven by the behaviour of Saudi Arabia.
42 Empirical Methodology
Event studies have been a popular empirical tool in many ¯elds for a great many years. A sum-
mary of the standard method can be found in Campbell et al [1997]; however, for completeness,
we give a brief description. Initially, consider an event which occurred at time T¤ and is believed
to have an impact on the returns of stock i. We proceed in two steps. First, we must get an
estimate of the normal returns of stock i. To do this we estimate:
Rit = ® + ¯Rmt + ²it (1)
over the period t = T¤ ¡ K ¡ L1;:::;T ¤ ¡ L1 ¡ 1, where L1 is the number of days before the
event in our window, K is the normal returns estimation period and Rmt denotes the market
return at time t. In studies with stock prices, K is typically taken to be 250 or 150 (Campbell
et al [1997]). Second, we calculate abnormal returns during the event window as:
^ ²¤
it = Rit ¡ ^ ® ¡ ^ ¯Rmt (2)
where here t = T¤ ¡ L1;:::;T ¤ + L2, and L2 is the number of days after the event.
Now consider a collection of events which occurred at times t1;:::;tN and de¯ne ²¤
ij to be
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where t = T¤ ¡ L1;:::;T ¤ + L2 and ¹ ²¤
i(k) is the kth element of the vector ¹ ²¤
i. Then, using
standard techniques we can test for signi¯cance of abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal
returns over the event window.
This method has been shown to be quite robust to certain deviations from the normality
assumption on the errors but it still su®ers from a number of drawbacks which we would like
to remedy in the present analysis. As in most event studies, we have the problem of choosing
the appropriate event window. We do not have a general data-driven method for calculating
the window; instead, we conform to most event studies and experiment with windows of various
length ranging from 1 to 20 days on either side of the event. Another concern is that the event
window is chosen to be the same across all ¯rms and all events in the study. While making the
analysis tractable and easy to estimate, it is likely not true. One might believe that some ¯rms
have closer relations with OPEC and so information may leak out sooner than with other ¯rms.
To avoid issues such as this we prefer to use indices of energy companies (e.g., service companies,
exploration companies, etc.) rather than individual ¯rms. Finally, the standard method has also
been criticised because it does not account for changes in variance due to increased uncertainty
during the event period (see Lockwood and Kadiyala [1988]). However, as reported in section 4
tests for changes in variance indicate that this is not a signi¯cant problem in the present setting.
3 Empirical Results
Our events are announcements by OPEC regarding their production quotas. Announcements are
divided into three types | quota reductions, quota expansions and status quo announcements.
We have data from 1986, when the current quota system was agreed upon, through to September
52002. As mentioned above, OPEC typically has between two and four regularly scheduled
meetings but at times will announce extraordinary meetings if it believes market conditions
are particularly uncertain.7 Our sample contains 50 announcements by OPEC. 12 of these
announcements are for reductions, 16 for increases and 22 maintain the status quo quota.8
Our stock market data includes market indices for service companies, integrated companies,
exploration & drilling companies as well as oil companies as a whole and we take as our market
basket the S&P 500.9 Daily data from 1 January 1986 to 30 September 2002 were obtained
from Datastream.
In the main text, we restrict our attention to these groups of oil companies. However, it is
intuitively clear that part of the in°uence OPEC announcements have on stock returns is via
their e®ects on oil prices. In particular, higher oil prices should translate into greater pro¯ts for
drilling and exploration companies since their output (and reserves) are more valuable. Higher
prices should also, indirectly, bene¯t service companies which provide support to drilling and
exploration ¯rms. On the other hand, one might expect lower prices to be bene¯cial to re¯ners,
since input costs are lower.10 Therefore, to corroborate our ¯ndings, in Appendix 2, we report
the results of a similar analysis on oil prices (both spot and two month forward prices). The
results are largely consistent with those discussed in the main text.
3.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns
In this subsection we report results using the traditional method of Campbell et al [1997]. We
take as our event window 20 days before and after the date of the event and 150 days prior to the
beginning of the event window as our normal returns estimation period.11 For now we simply
describe the results, which are reported in Tables 3 through 6 and can be seen graphically in
Figure A-2; in the next subsection we will draw inferences from them.
For each index we ¯nd negative cumulative abnormal returns for status quo announcements
which start to accrue in the days leading up to the announcement. Moreover, with the exception
of the integrated companies sub-index, all of the cumulative abnormal returns are signi¯cantly
less than zero at the 5% level (one-sided test) towards the end of the event window.12 It is also
important to note that these abnormal returns are quite large in percentage terms. After 20
days following the announcement, the cumulative abnormal returns are between -2.5 and -4.2%.
Thus it appears that OPEC, by its inaction, has the ability to signi¯cantly alter stock returns
in the days following such announcements.
Next consider reductions in the quota. The results are weaker, though still telling. Only
in the case of exploration companies do the cumulative abnormal returns become signi¯cantly
positive at the end of the event window. Indeed, here the e®ect is quite strong. 20 days following
the event, the cumulative abnormal returns are approximately 6%. While the CAR function
is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero only in the case of exploration companies, if one looks more
closely at the plot of the CAR functions, there is an interesting pattern which is consistent
across all groups. In particular, in the days leading up to an announced reduction in the quota,
positive abnormal returns accrue, peaking approximately 3 days before the announcement and
then make a signi¯cant fall, only to recover again at the end of the window. Finally, after some
7These extraordinary meetings are typically announced at the conclusion of a regularly scheduled meeting and
usually occur between one and three months later.
8The events were obtained from various issues of the New York Times and o±cial OPEC press releases.
9In particular, we have the series OILEPAM, OILINAM, OILSVAM and OILGSAM from Datastream, which are
indices of the exploration & production, integrated and services sub-sectors, and the energy sector as a whole for the
Americas.
10This latter claim is not obvious. In particular see Lewis [2003] and Borenstein and Shepard [1996] for a discussion
of tacit collusion in the retail gasoline market, which could invalidate the aforementioned claim.
11We experimented with various event window lengths and normal returns periods. The magnitude of some
estimates vary a little; however, the pattern and signi¯cance, in general, do not.
12If one adopts an event window of 15 days before and 15 days after the event, then this too becomes signi¯cantly
negative.
6days and once OPEC's resolve becomes clear the markets reaction turns favourable | indeed,
if one restricts analysis to days 12 through 20, signi¯cantly positive abnormal returns accrue
over this time.13 This ¯nding is signi¯cant for all of the sub-indices at the 5% level.
What could be the cause of this? One might suspect that before the commencement of
an OPEC meeting, the market is hopeful of an agreement and so positive returns accumulate.
However, as the meetings begin, perhaps due to uncertainty or a pro¯t-taking motive, prices
decline signi¯cantly. Finally, after the announcement and in the days following, OPEC's resolve
becomes more apparent and the positive e®ects of the quota reduction take hold.
One does wonder if there is a perverse explanation for this ¯nding, unrelated to market
fundamentals or expectations. However, the two events which had the biggest impact on oil
company stock prices and oil prices (11 September 2001 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait)
do not coincide properly with OPEC meetings (or their outcome) in order to generate such a
result. Thus, one is tempted to believe that market psychology about OPEC's resolve is, in
fact, generating the result. Furthermore, as with the ¯nding for status quo announcements, the
cumulative returns at the end of the window are between 2 and 6%. So again, the impact of
such announcements by OPEC is rather large.
Finally we consider announcements of quota increases. Here the results fall into two di®erent
categories. For the oil sector as a whole and the exploration sub-sector, announcements of
increases in the quota were met with no signi¯cant abnormal returns - either positive or negative.
For integrated companies, the impact of a quota increase seems generally positive, though not
signi¯cant.14 On the other hand, for service companies the impact of an increase in the quota
is met with negative cumulative abnormal returns which are signi¯cant.
Remark 1. It is important to note that although the CAR functions for quota reductions were
not all signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the end of the event window, the di®erence between
the CAR functions for reductions and status quo announcements for each index are signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero at the end of the window. Thus, the market reaction is very di®erent for an
announcement of a quota reduction than it is for a status quo announcement. We now turn to
such issues.
3.2 Interpretation and Discussion
Let us now move to a discussion of the empirical results just presented. As alluded to in the
introduction, the results indicate that OPEC has an asymmetric ability to secure agreements
depending on whether the economy is in a good state or a bad state of the world. First, the fact
that neither signi¯cantly positive nor signi¯cantly negative abnormal returns are associated with
an increase in the quota implies that such events are anticipated by the stock market. Therefore,
when such an announcement is made, say due to a positive demand shock, it does not come as a
surprise. Second, the fact that abnormal returns do occur for the other announcements implies
greater uncertainty in OPEC's ability to agree to a reduction following a negative shock. To see
this, suppose that demand is lower and OPEC should reduce its quota. Given the realisation of
demand, the market forms expectations about whether an agreement will occur or not; however,
these beliefs are much more di®use than the case of when demand has increased. Thus when
the announcement is made, the market reacts to either announcement and abnormal returns of
the kind reported above are quite likely to occur.
To us, this is an eminently reasonable explanation of what happens here and in many other
bargaining situations. However, it is just one possible interpretation and so far rests only upon a
logical argument. Thus, before we can be satis¯ed that it is the correct interpretation, we must
provide further evidence. Before proceeding, we ¯rst dispel one alternative explanation. One
may argue that an agreement to adjust the quota, either up or down, signals that OPEC as a
cartel is strong but that status quo announcements signal weakness in the cartel. However, such
13Day 12 was chosen as it appeared to be a trough for all four sub-indices. Furthermore, in two cases there was a
signi¯cantly negative return on day 11 (for a third sub-index the return was barely insigni¯cant).
14However, the abnormal returns are signi¯cantly greater than those which accrue following inaction by OPEC.
7an explanation cannot hold. To see this, suppose that it was true. Then we would not see an
asymmetric pattern of abnormal returns; instead, we should observe positive abnormal returns
for both increases and decreases in the quota. In the remainder of this section we attempt to
give further support for our interpretation of the results by analysing status quo announcements
more carefully.
In making its decisions, OPEC must form expectations about the expected path of demand
for crude oil, supply by non-OPEC members and changes in inventories. Our strategy, therefore,
is to forecast these variables for the quarter immediately following an OPEC meeting. With
these forecasts, we can get some idea of the oil market balance and determine, in some sense,
the required course of action by OPEC. We can then compare the required course of action with
the actual outcome to determine any observable patterns of OPEC behaviour. We also consider
forecasts of the two month forward price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil, which should
act as a summary statistic of the oil market balance. In the next section we provide further
robustness checks for both the empirical results and our interpretation. The data used for this
analysis was provided by the Energy Information Agency of the U.S. Department of Energy.
Consider ¯rst oil prices. If one believes in an e±cient market, then it should be the case
that the price of oil acts as a summary statistic for the oil market balance. That is, if prices
are expected to rise it should indicate tightness of the market, say because of strong demand
growth. Thus if prices are expected to rise, this may indicate a need for OPEC to increase its
quota, while if prices are expected to fall, it implies a need to reduce the quota.15 This is our
most convincing test. In 17 out of 21 cases, we found that the two-month forward price of West
Texas Intermediate oil was expected to fall. Moreover, of the four cases in which the price was
expected to rise, barring any action by OPEC, one coincided with the ¯rst Persian Gulf War
and the remaining three were after the Asian Financial Crisis. As the reader shall presently see,
this result is in line with the anecdotal evidence pointing to a shift in OPEC behaviour around
the time of the Asian Crisis.
We now seek to disentangle some of the potentially di®erent e®ects arising due to shocks to
production, consumption and storage. For each of OECD crude oil consumption, non-OPEC
production and OECD crude oil inventories we estimated a univariate time-series model using
data up to the month of the OPEC meeting. We then used the estimated parameters of the
model to obtain a forecast for each of the next three months.16;17 One useful measure which
captures part of the oil market balance is the di®erence between the expected change in OECD
consumption and the expected change in non-OPEC production. If this number is positive, it
suggests a role for OPEC to increase its quota, while if it is negative a reduction is more likely
in order. For the 21 status quo announcements, between 8 and 12 (depending on the method
of forecasting) of the announcements involved falling consumption.
Another measure which also captures part of the oil market balance is the expected change
in inventories of crude oil held by OECD countries. Declining expected inventories indicate
tightness in the market and a need for an increase in the quota, while the opposite result holds
for an expected increase. Here, for over half of the status quo announcements, inventories were
expected to increase, indicating little pressure on oil prices (see Kaufmann [2002]). Taken as
a whole, our forecasts on oil prices as well as net consumption growth and inventories indicate
that the underlying market conditions called, more often, for a reduction in the quota when the
actual course taken by OPEC was to remain with the status quo.
The three measures reported above relate, in some way, to expectations about future devel-
opments in the oil market. However, it has often been argued in the popular press that OPEC
15Of course to some extent, even in the month prior to an OPEC meeting, the market may have already priced-in
expectations of OPEC action. We ignore such di±culties in what follows.
16For OECD consumption we estimated an ARIMA(1,1,1) model and added both a quarterly autoregressive and
moving average term to account for seasonal variation. The other two series were estimated as strictly ARIMA(1,1,1)
models.
17We also estimated models which included seasonal dummy variables and U.S. industrial production as regressors.
In all cases, the qualitative results were unchanged. Indeed, the predictions of our oil price forecasts are even stronger.
8is in°uenced by past events. That this claim has merit is apparent given OPEC's price band
mechanism whereby an automatic increase in production is to be implemented if prices become
too high for a protracted period, while production is to be cut if prices are too low. Thus one
may be tempted to examine the past market conditions as a guide for OPEC's action.
With the data available to us, we must disentangle shifts in demand from movement along
the demand curve for OPEC oil. A rather crude identi¯cation strategy is to use the elasticity
of demand and revenues to identify shifts in demand. For example, if the demand function is
unit elastic then changes in revenue are equivalent to changes in demand. We can extend this
to the case in which demand is not unit elastic and calculate the implied change in revenue and
then use this to identify shifts in demand. In this situation, the implied change in revenue is:
¢IR = Q ¢ (1 + ²) ¢ ¢P
where ² is the elasticity of demand. Then, if the implied change in revenue is less than the
actual change in revenue we have identi¯ed, if only very crudely, an increase in demand. Typical
estimates for the price elasticity of demand range between -0.2 and -0.6. Using an X-11 seasonal
adjustment for OECD consumption, we ¯nd that the di®erence between the implied and actual
change in revenues indicates negative demand shocks in 14 of 21 status quo announcements.18
Thus, well over half of the status quo announcements come during times of falling demand for
OPEC oil.
4 Robustness Checks
This short section has two purposes. The ¯rst is to subject our empirical results to further
robustness checks. In particular, we report a number of non-parametric tests on the nature of
abnormal returns and measures of variance. After arguing that the empirical results survive this
analysis, we then provide further, mainly anecdotal, evidence in favour of our interpretation.
4.1 Non-Parametric Tests
Even though the (cumulative) abnormal returns may not be signi¯cant in any time period, we
are still able to say something about their nature. Speci¯cally, a Wilcoxon signed rank test
tests for whether or not more than half of the abnormal returns are of a particular sign. For
each of the four sub-indices we test the null hypothesis that 50% of the returns are positive for
each class of event. Considering status quo announcements, with the exception of the integrated
companies sub-index, we are able to reject this hypothesis in favour of the alternative that more
than 50% of the abnormal returns are negative.19 This result strengthens the event analysis
above which says that announcements of inaction by OPEC lead to signi¯cantly lower stock
returns.
In only one other instance - for the service companies sub-index - do we ¯nd a moderately
signi¯cant result. Here we ¯nd weak evidence that increasing the quota is more likely to generate
a negative return than a positive return. This ¯nding, too, is also consistent with the event
analysis presented above.
[Table 1 Here]
In criticising the standard event study techniques Lockwood and Kadiyala [1988] and Cyree
and Degennaro [2002] hint that changes in variance during the event window may be important.
For each event in the data we can conduct a simple F-test, where the null hypothesis is that the
variance term ¾2 is the same during the normal returns period and during the event window. For
the oil sub-index we estimated that for 7 of the 50 events the variance was di®erent during the
18The precise method of seasonal adjustment made little di®erence in the qualitative results.
19The result for integrated companies is only mildly insigni¯cant.
9two periods. The corresponding number for the integrated companies, exploration companies
and service companies sub-indices is 5, 3 and 3 respectively. This suggests that changes in
variance are not as important as one might think. Furthermore, a non-parametric test similar
in spirit to the Wilcoxon signed rank test never rejects the null hypothesis that variance is
constant for each of the three di®erent classes of event.
4.2 Anecdotal Evidence
We now return to issues related to our interpretation of the results. The forecasts of the
last section and the non-parametric tests just reported support our argument that status quo
announcements typically arise when demand is falling or otherwise sluggish. Figure 1, below,
gives some indication as to the relationship between OECD crude oil consumption and OPEC's
quota. Especially prior to 1995, it seems that increases in OECD consumption have typically
been met with OPEC quota increases.20
However, just looking at Figure 1 cannot give us a complete picture and, indeed, one must
be careful in drawing conclusions from it since it cannot distinguish between shifts in demand
and movement along the demand curve. Continuing with our intuitive discussion we now turn
to the published New York Times reports which contained news of OPEC's decision. There
is plenty of anecdotal evidence which suggests that OPEC is a good test of our intuition that
agreements are more di±cult when times are bad rather than when times are good. For instance,
discord among OPEC members is quite common. For example, in its June 1988 production
announcement maintaining the status quo, the New York Times reports that both Iraq and the
United Arab Emirates exempted themselves from the quota. This happened despite the fact
that oil prices were low and overproduction was widely noted. Again, in 1993, Kuwait held up an
agreement that would have lowered production in an attempt to strengthen weak oil prices with
its demands for even more production. With varying intensities, such a pattern has continued
until this day. In recent years, disagreement has often circled around how best to bring Iraq
back into the quota system. The active members appeared unwilling to accommodate Iraqi
production, leaving analysts expecting huge gluts of oil and fearing a market collapse. Notice
that, this anecdotal evidence also indicates that such disagreements are more probable during
bad times (for OPEC) rather than good.
A more detailed analysis of these reports can also provide further insight into the market
psychology following OPEC's decision not to change the quota. Similarly to the graphical
analysis above, we ¯nd some evidence of a structural break occurring around the time of the
Asian Financial Crisis. Speci¯cally, from December 1987 to June 1997 there were 16 status quo
announcements made by OPEC. In only two of these events could one unambiguously make the
case that the alternative choice on the table was an increase in production.21 In some cases
the status quo appeared to be the decision that was called for, while in the majority of others,
the published news reports cite disagreement in being able to reduce the quota or that OPEC's
actions signal an even higher likelihood of cheating.
In contrast, after the Asian Financial Crisis, a shift in OPEC philosophy seems to have
occurred. In the eight status quo announcements between July 1997 and September 2002, in
only one case can it be read as a failure of OPEC to reduce the quota to induce a price increase,
while in three cases the action appears to have been taken to drive prices up even further. One
wonders whether this is due to caution on OPEC's part or a result of the tense political situation
in the Middle-East. Indeed, despite the weak economy of 2002, oil prices remained high because
of uncertainty over the situation in Iraq - something which is still felt in the current oil market.
According to published statements by OPEC, the cartel appears loathe to change its quota due
to these political uncertainties. Having left its quota unchanged in March, June and September
2002, OPEC justi¯ed its decision stating that \the relative strength in current market prices is
20Note that the scale for the quota is on the right-hand side, while that for OECD consumption is on the left-hand
side.
21These two events were the announcements of November 1994 and November 1996.
10partially a re°ection of the prevailing political situation rather than solely the consequence of
market fundamentals."
5 Theoretical Discussion
In this section we turn to a theoretical discussion of the empirical results. As we have often
mentioned, the results indicate an asymmetry in OPEC's internal bargaining structure. In
particular, there must be something which makes agreements more likely to occur when the
quota should be relaxed and less likely to occur when the quota should be tightened. Thus
when the market believes the quota should be relaxed, it will be priced into stock prices and
any resulting increase in the quota will not be met with further movement in the stock prices.
On the other hand, when the market has the opposite beliefs, then there is room for a strong
positive or negative reaction ex post to any OPEC announcement because, though it sees a need
for a change in policy, the market believes an agreement much less likely.
5.1 Problems With Standard Theory
In an attempt to come up with a reasonable theoretical explanation for our results, the ¯rst
thing to notice is that standard repeated game arguments necessarily fail if we are willing to
assume an e±cient stock market. Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Haltiwanger and Harrington
[1991] develop models of repeated collusive interaction and examine the properties of the most
collusive equilibrium. The latter predicts that cooperation will be the most di±cult to sustain
when demand is decreasing. The reason that collusion is di±cult to sustain during periods
of falling demand is because the future punishments available to prevent deviations are much
weaker.
It is true that our empirical ¯ndings indicate that collusion is more di±cult to sustain during
bad times. However, to say that our ¯ndings are consistent with the aforementioned theories
would be a mistake. In both the models of Rotemberg and Saloner [1986] and Haltiwanger
and Harrington [1991], no place is allowed for surprise. Again consider the latter model and
suppose that a negative demand shock has just been observed. How would an e±cient market
react? It would recognise that full collusion is no longer possible; therefore, the stock price
would immediately adjust downwards to its new level. When an announcement is ¯nally made
concerning the new quota, there would be no reaction since the impact would already be priced
into the stock. A similar adjustment, though in the opposite direction, would occur if a positive
demand shock was realised. What is missing then from these models is the possibility that the
market can be surprised by some announcements and not by others; indeed, the market will
never be surprised in either model.
The next place in the existing literature that one is drawn towards is that of bargaining with
incomplete information. However, as we now argue, this literature also has little to o®er in the
way of explaining our empirical ¯ndings. Much of it is concerned with negotiations between a
single buyer and seller in which the valuation of the buyer is not known rather than splitting a pie
(see e.g., Schmidt [1993] and Hart and Tirole [1988]). It is di±cult to think of a natural way to
extend such models to the current setting. A more fundamental problem, beyond simply ¯nding
a convenient way to extend the models, is that their main predictions are inconsistent with our
empirical ¯ndings. In particular, many of the models predict that the seller sets price equal to
the lowest possible valuation buyer for all but the last periods. Thus very little information is
revealed. This stands in sharp contrast to our empirical ¯ndings in which signi¯cant information
is revealed at each meeting | especially in periods of weak demand.
Let us examine the standard two player Cournot game with linear inverse demand given by
P(Qt) = At¡Qt, where Qt is the agreed upon total quota to see if any mileage can be obtained





Now suppose that a demand shock has occurred; demand is now ¹ At and the quota is initially
left unchanged at Qt. Then we can de¯ne the bargaining space as the extra pro¯ts to be had by
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and note that Bt ¸ 0. Thus we see that whether demand has gone up or down, we always have
a non-negative bargaining space.
It is clear that incomplete information must be carefully placed into the model to generate
consistent predictions. For example, cost uncertainties will not do. Their in°uence on the
model would be entirely symmetric with respect to positive and negative demand shocks. As
we have alluded to earlier, a wedge must be placed in such a way that, with some probability,
the bargaining space, Bt, is negative following a decrease in demand. Moreover, the bargaining
space should remain positive following an increase in demand. In what follows we present two
very simple ways to introduce incomplete information, which can generate predictions consistent
with those that we have reported above. The ¯rst introduces a probability that a cartel member
cannot commit to produce only its quota. Another way, which we discuss in Section 5.3, is the
introduction of behavioural types.
5.2 Disagreement As A Perceived Lack Of Commitment
The situation we have in mind is a cartel of n > 2 members which meets every period to decide
upon the quota for the current period given the realisation of demand. We take a very simple
view of the cartel. In particular, membership in the cartel implies a high degree of commitment
not to produce more than the allocated quota. However, we allow for the possibility that at
most one country will periodically experience a random shock.22 In what follows we will assume
that the random shock is private information but that all cartel members receive a signal which
is correlated to the true realisation of the random shock. When a country experiences a shock
then we assume that it loses the ability to commit to its agreed upon quota. The country may,
therefore, be tempted to deviate from the cartel agreement. Whether it does deviate depends
on two things | the magnitude of the shock and the punishment that the other cartel members
can impose upon the deviator.
We then adopt a very simple rule about how the quota is adjusted. In particular, we assume
that the cartel is constrained between two choices; when demand has increased, it can either
increase the quota by some ¯xed positive amount or maintain the status quo, while when demand
has decreased, it can either decrease the quota by some ¯xed amount or maintain the status quo.
Upon observing demand information and private signals regarding the true realisation of the
shock, cartel members vote on the proposals for the quota. Voting is by majority rule, though
we do not model this stage formally.
Given these assumptions, the model predicts quite nicely the empirical result that we have
discussed throughout the paper. The reason is very simple. When demand increases, pro¯t
maximisation dictates that the quota should be increased. Moreover, doing so also lessens the
static gain to a deviation and, therefore, makes such deviations less likely to occur. However,
when demand has decreased, we have a tension. Pro¯t maximisation dictates that the quota
should be reduced, but doing so increases the static gain to a deviation and, therefore, makes
such a deviation more likely. Therefore, cartel members may be tempted to vote against a
reduction in the quota, especially if their signal regarding the true realisation of the random
shock is strong enough.
With this intuition in mind, let us now proceed with a more formal discussion of the model.
Note that everything could be embedded in the frame work of a repeated game with incomplete
information. However, in the interests of clarity and simplicity, we present, instead, its static
equivalent. Suppose that there are n > 2 ex ante identical members of a cartel who meet each
period to decide upon a quota for the current period. Suppose that the inverse demand function
is given by P(At;Qt), where At is a measure of demand at time t and Qt =
P
i qit is the total
production of the cartel at time t. Given demand and the production decisions of each cartel
member, let ¼it(P(At;Qt);qit) denote the pro¯ts of country i at time t. Our point of departure
from the standard model is the following. Write the per-period utility function of country i
22This assumption is not necessary but it serves to greatly simplify things; see Remark 4 below.
12as u(µit;¼it(P(At;Qt);qit)) and assume that @
2u
@µ@¼ > 0 so that the marginal utility of pro¯ts is
increasing in µit.23 We assume that µit is private information and a new realisation is drawn
each period for each cartel member.24 Given our assumption regarding how µ enters the utility
function, it can be thought of as the importance, relative to other activities, of pro¯ts generated
from the cartel. For example, suppose that country i experienced a severe natural disaster at
time t; then it will have strong needs for revenues in order to pay for relief and reconstruction
e®orts. In our view, we would interpret this as a high realisation of µit.
We now describe the process by which random shocks occur. As we have said above, we
assume that at most one country may experience a random shock to µ. That is, let ¹ µt ´ maxfµitg
and assume that ¹ µt » F, where F is a distribution with support on [a;b], 0 · a < b · 1. This
implies that if ¹ µt = µit for some i 2 f1;:::;ng, then µjt = a for all j 6= i. The speci¯c
interpretation of µjt is the following. When µjt = a, then everything is normal for country j;
however, if µjt > a, then country j has experienced some adverse shock to its economy and
places greater signi¯cance on revenues from the cartelised industry. As we have said, at most
one country may experience a shock at any time period. However, it may be the case that
normal times prevail for all countries. To capture this, assume that F(a) = p 2 (0;1) and that
this is the only mass point in the distribution function, F.
With these preliminaries in mind, let us now describe the mechanism by which cartel mem-
bers set the quota. Assume that each period, demand is realised and publicly observed by
all cartel members. Next assume that each cartel member learns its particular realisation µit;
moreover, suppose that each country obtains an informative signal ~ µit from some conditional
distribution G(~ µj¹ µ) regarding realised value of ¹ µt = maxfµitg. Given the realisation of ~ µ, cartel
members update their beliefs about the true state of the world using Bayes' Rule. Let F(¹ µj~ µj)
denote j's posterior distribution over the true state, ¹ µ. As we said above in our intuitive discus-
sion, we adopt a simple voting procedure for implementing changes in the quota. In particular,
when demand has increased, the cartel can either increase its quota by some discrete, positive
amount, ¢ ^ QI(At; ^ Qt¡1) or remain with the status quo, where ^ Qt¡1 is the quota that prevailed
in the previous period. On the other hand, if demand has decreased, the cartel can either de-
crease the quota by a discrete, negative amount, ¢ ^ QD(At; ^ Qt¡1) or remain at the status quo.
Each member votes either in favour of the proscribed change or in favour of the status quo.
It should be clear that when demand has increased, it will be a dominant strategy for all
players, except possibly the one which received a positive shock to µ, to vote in favour of an
increase in the quota. The reason is that by voting in favour of the increase in the quota, it is
increasing its pro¯ts (since an increase in the quota is what is called for) and it is lowering the
probability that a potential deviant will defect from the cartel agreement because an increase
in the quota lowers the static gain from a deviation.
However, when demand has gone down, voting in favour of reducing the quota is no longer
a dominant strategy. To be sure, a reduction in the quota will increase a cartel member's
pro¯ts so long as (a) no countries receive a shock to µ or (b) a country receives a shock, and,
therefore, loses the ability to commit, but is prevented from deviating for fear of the future
punishment ¤(At). However, by voting to reduce the quota by ¢ ^ QD(At; ^ Qt¡1), the cartel is
increasing the gains from a potential deviator, and, therefore, increasing the likelihood of a
deviation. Suppose that country i realised µit > a. We know that it will deviate if and only
if u(µit;¼t(Pbr
t ;qbr
it )) ¡ u(µit;¼t(Pt;qit)) > ¤(At); therefore, there is some critical value µ¤( ^ Qt),
which depends on the current quota, ^ Qt, such that i deviates if and only if ¹ µt = µit ¸ µ¤( ^ Qt).
Given a signal ~ µj for player j, we obtain the posterior distribution, F(¹ µj~ µj) and are in a
position to calculate the expected utility of player j, ¯rst under the scenario in which the quota
is reduced to ^ Ql
t = ^ Qt¡1 + ¢ ^ QD(At; ^ Qt¡1) and second when the status quo is maintained. We
23For example, suppose that u(µ;¼) = µ ¢ ¼.
24In particular, assume that the draws are i.i.d. over time.
13calculate this former expected utility as:
V l
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where the ¯rst square-bracketed term represents the expected utility provided that there is no
deviation, which, player j believes will occur with probability F(µ¤( ^ Ql
t)j~ µj). The second square-
bracketed term represents the expected utility in the situation in which a country deviates,
which, player j believes will occur with probability 1 ¡ F(µ¤( ^ Ql
t)j~ µj). The term Vj(¤(At)) is
the continuation value of player j under the situation in which a deviation has occurred and the
cartel moves to punish the deviator. In a similar manner, we may calculate the expected utility
under the scenario in which the quota is left unchanged at ^ Qt¡1:
Vj(At; ^ Qt¡1) = F(µ¤( ^ Qt¡1)j~ µj) ¢
h
u(a;¼(Pt;qjt)) + ±EVj(At+1; ^ Qt+1)
i
+ (1 ¡ F(µ¤( ^ Qt¡1)j~ µj)) ¢
£
u(a;¼(Pbr
t ;qjt)) + ±EVj(¤(At))
¤ (4)
The same interpretation applies to the two-square bracketed terms.
It is clear that player j will vote in favour of a reduction in the quota if and only if
V l
j(At; ^ Ql
t) ¸ Vj(At; ^ Qt¡1). The tension is clearly visible in (3) and (4). Given our assumptions,
we have that µ¤(x) is an increasing function of x. Therefore, F(µ¤( ^ Qt¡1)j~ µj) > F(µ¤( ^ Ql
t)j~ µj)
and so country j believes a deviation to be more likely if the quota is reduced than if the
status quo is maintained. Thus, for a ¯xed ~ µjt, player j is more likely to vote in favour of
the status quo. However, working in the opposite direction we also have, u(a;¼(Pt( ^ Ql
t);ql
jt)) ¡
u(a;¼(Pt( ^ Qt¡1);qjt)) > 0; the bigger this di®erence, the more likely is country j to vote in
favour of a reduction in the quota. Clearly then, under appropriate regularity conditions on F
and G, we will have the existence of a threshold, µ¤
j, such that j votes against a reduction in
the quota if and only if ~ µj ¸ µ¤
j.25 A similar analysis can be conducted for all cartel members
j 6= i, where i denotes the country, if any, which experienced a realisation µi > a.
We can summarise with the following result:
Proposition 1. Given the assumptions of the model, the cartel will always vote to increase the
quota following a positive demand shock, while if demand has decreased, the cartel will vote
against the proposed decrease if a majority of cartel members receive signals, ~ µj, high enough.
Proof. This follows immediately from the discussion above.
Remark 2. We can cite at least one example consistent with the model that we have just
presented. In 1992 OPEC met with the wish to lower its total production quota. However, it
was dissuaded from doing so because of Kuwaiti demands that it be able to produce as much
oil as it could in order to generate revenues necessary to pay for its restoration as a result of
damage sustained from the ¯rst Persian Gulf War. While it was quite clear that Kuwait su®ered
a great deal of damage and was in need of oil revenues, it is reasonable to argue that nobody
knew the exact extent of this damage. To a lesser extent, it has been noted (see Mabro [2001],
in particular) that uncertainty regarding the political situation in Venezuela prevented OPEC
from acting many times in the mid-1990s.
Remark 3. As we mentioned above, the model could be embedded within the framework of
repeated games; however, we believe that this will not alter the main predictions of the model.
The main di±culty in transforming our model into a repeated game would be to endogenise the
available punishments, ¤(At). Consider the approach of Haltiwanger and Harrington [1991] in
which demand follows a deterministic process. Now suppose that demand has decreased and
25Of course, this threshold will depend on the parameters of the model. In particular, it will depend upon the
strength of the signal as well as on ^ Qt¡1 and ^ Q
l
t.
14consider the identical thought experiment as above | reducing the quota still increases the
static gain to a deviation but because demand has, in any case, decreased, this gain may still be
smaller than the corresponding gain to deviation when demand was At¡1 and the quota ^ Qt¡1.
If this were the only e®ect, then our result would be destabilised; however, we must also analyse
the punishments. In a Haltiwanger and Harrington setting, since demand has decreased, it is
more likely that demand will be lower next period; therefore, ¤(At) is also smaller, and so, the
available punishments are weaker, making deviations potentially more likely. Thus there is still
a tension which occurs in the minds of a cartel member when deciding whether or not to vote
in favour of a quota reduction.
Remark 4. We can relax the assumption that at most one cartel member receives a negative
shock in each period. The key insight to doing so it to note that a cartel member which received
a shock may still vote in favour of an increase in the quota (if demand has increased) or against
a reduction in the quota (if demand has decreased), provided that the size of its shock is not
too great. For example, suppose that demand has decreased and country i has received a small
shock; that is, µit ¼ a. Because the shock is small, i is unlikely to gain from a deviation, even if
the quota is reduced. However, suppose that i received a signal, ~ µ
j
it ¼ b, regarding the realisation
of j's shock. In this case, i believes that j has very strong incentives to deviate and so will vote
against any reduction in the quota. A similar thought experiment can be conducted for the case
in which demand increases. Hence the main intuition follows and we can expect disagreements
to be much more likely following a decrease in demand rather than an increase.
5.3 A Behavioural Approach
The model presented above is very intuitive and cleanly predicts our empirical ¯nding that
agreements are less likely to arise in bad times. While it was without loss of generality to
consider a static equivalent of the dynamic game, our restriction that the cartel could only
choose between changing the quota in the direction of the demand change and the status quo
was not. We believe that the assumption is a reasonable approximation of OPEC behaviour at
any point in time, we note it as a potential drawback.
The behavioural model to which we turn has proposals which are endogenously determined
by the players and, therefore, does not su®er from such criticism. Moreover, the special way
in which reference points enter into the utility function allows us to generate virtually identical
predictions regarding the exact nature of agreements. In particular, disagreements will never
occur when demand has increased but will probabilistically occur following a negative demand
shock. As the reader shall see, the model is also more faithful to the intuition given by a number
of authors in the experimental economics as well as organisational behaviour literature. Indeed,
Bazerman and Carroll [1987] argued that the likelihood of disagreements is much greater when
participants frame negotiations in terms of losses, rather than the overall gains of a successful
agreement. One can see a clear role for reference points | when times are prosperous all
participants are more likely to view negotiations in a positive frame than they would when
times are bad.
To understand this intuition better, let us return to an example considered earlier | that of
a university deciding how to allocate funds to its various departments. Each department enters
into the discussions with a status quo level of funding. If times are prosperous, the university
can easily increase funding to each department. Thus, one might imagine an agreement to be
easily forthcoming since the gains from the status quo are easily visible. However, now suppose
that times are not good. In this situation, cuts are necessary and it is much more di±cult to
view negotiations in terms of gains rather than losses. Therefore, we may except that each
department vehemently opposes any cuts to its status quo level of funding. Thus, we may view
the status quo as the moral or emotional equivalent of a property right held by the department
heads. The unique aspect of this status quo is that it only bites when property rights must be
taken away.
This intuition has recently been demonstrated to have force in an experimental work by
15GÄ achter and Riedl [2003]. In this paper they coin the term moral property right to describe
a claim held by a person even though the claim has no legal basis and is \often [rooted] in
historical claims, custom or the status quo." Speci¯cally, they consider a bargaining situation
in which the moral property rights are no longer feasible.26 It was shown that bargaining was
signi¯cantly a®ected by the presence of moral property rights. In particular, opening o®ers were
strongly correlated with perceived rights and, more importantly, the outcome was very close
to the focal point predicted under the hypothesis that moral property rights signi¯cantly a®ect
behaviour.
It is not di±cult to imagine that the logic of GÄ achter and Riedl [2003] and Bazerman and
Carroll [1987] extends much more generally. We, therefore, turn our attention to such issues.
Indeed, return to our setting and suppose that demand has increased, then property rights
(i.e., quotas) of all can be expanded and there is no con°ict since property rights increase with
pro¯ts in this case. However, if demand has decreased, then the status quo quotas bite; this is
because to increase pro¯ts, property rights must be taken away. This may cause cartel members
to view the negotiations, at least partly, in terms of lost property rights, rather than higher
pro¯ts. Therefore, disagreement becomes considerably more likely as each cartel member ¯ghts
to maintain property rights. In what follows we present a rudimentary analysis of this intuition
and demonstrate that such a model can explain the main empirical ¯ndings.
5.3.1 A Simple Model
The following two person example guides us throughout the formal analysis. There is a linear
inverse demand function given by:
P(Qt;At) = At ¡ Qt
where Qt = qt
1 + qt
2 denotes total production at time t and At represents the state of demand.
In each period the players play the Cournot equilibrium with quota (¹ qt
1; ¹ qt
2) where it is assumed
that players sign binding contracts not to produce more than their quota. We assume that cartel
members do not experience any direct utility from their quota but experience a psychological
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i] (5)
where ® > 0 represents the psychological cost of losing property rights to produce ¹ q
t¡1
i and ui
is the utility arising from the Cournot game given demand and quotas. Notice that this is not
the standard loss-averse utility function in two respects. First, we assume that ui is a standard
utility function. Second, we assume that increasing the quota beyond the status quo does not
provide any extra utility. Suppose we had a term, ®1(qt
i ¡ q
t¡1
i ) ¢ I[q
t¡1
i < qt
i], in the utility
function with 0 < ®1 < ® to give us a more standard representation of loss aversion. In this
situation, it would always be optimal to have an in¯nite quota. To avoid this triviality we set
®1 = 0.
Let ®it denote the realised psychological cost for player i at time t and suppose ¯rst that
it is private information and second that ®it is iid across time and across players with some
distribution F : R+ 7! [0;1]. Now suppose that in each period demand is realised and the
players meet to discuss the quota for the observed demand. To keep things simple, assume that
bargaining is of the ultimatum type in which player 1 proposes a quota in odd periods and
player 2 proposes a quota in even periods.
Imagine a situation in which demand increases so that ¹ q
t¡1




2 . Then there is a
surplus of A
t
2 ¡ ¹ q
t¡1
1 ¡ ¹ q
t¡1
2 and no need to worry about costs associated with losing property
26By this we mean that the sum of the claims is larger than the size of the pie. Historical claims for a two-thirds
share of a pie of size 2490 were allocated by means of a competitive task.
16rights. However, if we are in the opposite situation in which ¹ q
t¡1




2 then the quota
must be reduced in order to increase pro¯ts. Conditional on his realisation, the proposer must
choose an allocation qt to maximise his expected pro¯ts. Then following a decrease in demand,
two things work to make disagreements a distinct possibility. First, if the realisation of the
proposer is high enough, he may be unwilling to make an o®er which involves the quota being
reduced. Second, given the o®er of the proposer, if the responder's cost realisation is high enough,
she may rather reject so that the psychological cost is not incurred. Thus to be reasonably sure
of agreements, both players must have low psychological cost realisations. Of course, if demand
increases the players need not worry about the psychological cost parameter of the other player;
therefore, agreements will always be forthcoming.
5.3.2 Extensions
Of course one must ask why a cartel member's utility function would give such weight to the
cartel, beyond its role in determining revenues. One might relate this to status - the higher
the quota the more status within the cartel a member has. This idea has some merits; indeed,
competitions for status may take place in which one member refuses to agree unless he or she is
given comparable status to another member. For example, during the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq was
often exempted from its quota obligations and refused to rejoin the quota system unless it was
given an equal quota to that of Iran. This is despite the fact that Iran is both geographically
larger and more populous than Iraq. Moreover, status can be seen at play in other situations.
After the ¯rst Persian Gulf War, Saudi Arabia was able to increase its share of OPEC production
quite dramatically and has resisted attempts to relinquish this higher share. Today, Nigeria also
seems concerned about its status within OPEC arguing that its current share of production is
not in line with either its population or its proven reserves.
However, if we are to take status seriously, we must allow for the reference point to be
something other than last period's quota. Instead, denote by at
i the reference point of player i
at time t. We can allow for status by assuming that at
i > q
t¡1
i - that is, player i demands an
increased quota.27 Surely if demand has decreased then this makes agreements even less likely
to occur. On the other hand, if demand has increased then player i will just as surely not reject
an o®er which simultaneously increases his revenues and his quota, even if the new quota falls
short of his aspiration level. The reason is that rejecting would lead to the status quo which
is even worse. This model would then predict that changes in status occur when demand has
decreased rather than when it has increased.
Furthermore, we can allow property rights to evolve over time in a more general fashion.
That is, let at




i + (1 ¡ ¸)qt
i. Then it becomes interesting to know whether ¸ is closer to 0 or to
1. The latter indicates very slow adjustments of property rights, while the former very fast
adjustments. One might think that the more quickly property rights evolve then the more
di±cult agreements are when the size of the pie shrinks. This follows because the players very
quickly become accustomed to a higher quota and are then loathe to give it up if demand then
decreases. On the other hand, if property rights evolve more slowly, then disagreements will be
less likely to occur because each player has some slack in his property rights or aspirations that
he can give up before incurring any psychological costs.
This would be an interesting exercise because over time, the original reason for the unequal
split fades away from the memories of the players but last period's split of the pie is still fresh
in the memory. Thus, once property rights are attained through a competitive process does the
inequality still remain through time? An exercise as outlined above will also shed some light on
whether or not agreements do come about more easily, or more quickly when the size of the pie
has increased.




j so that player i aspires, or feels entitled to, equal treatment with regard
to player j.
176 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented the results of an event study analysis of OPEC behaviour and
its e®ects on the stock returns in the energy sector. The results are quite clear. When OPEC
reduces the quota, positive and often signi¯cant abnormal returns accrue in the four sub-sectors
considered. Next, when the quota is increased, there is no signi¯cant pattern of abnormal
returns. Finally, when OPEC takes no action negative and signi¯cant abnormal return accrue
across all sectors. Moreover, these abnormal returns appear to be economically meaningful,
accumulating in some cases to §5% by the end of the event window.
We believe strongly that these results o®er us an interesting insight into OPEC's decision-
making behaviour. Speci¯cally, we think the results indicate an asymmetric ability of OPEC
to secure agreements. That is, when demand is increasing, OPEC is far more likely to increase
the quota than they are to decrease it when demand is decreasing. In part, this interpretation
is con¯rmed when one examines the news reports surrounding these status quo announcements.
However, there appears to be a shift in behaviour since the Asian Financial Crisis. In support
of our interpretation we went back to the news reports and found convincing evidence that most
status quo announcements prior to the Asian Crisis were in periods of falling demand. This
anecdotal evidence was further supported through forecasts of oil prices. Overwhelmingly, the
forecasts implied falling prices for the following quarter.
Both of the models considered in Section 5 explain, though in di®erent ways, the main em-
pirical ¯nding of this paper | namely, that disagreements are more likely during poor economic
times. In the ¯rst model the possibility of random shocks serves to generate the result. In
particular, a country which experiences a random shock, loses its ability to commit not to de-
viate. Deviations can still be deterred via the threat of punishments. Moreover, when demand
increases, the cartel can increase the static pro¯ts of its members and reduce the static gain to
any deviation. However, when demand has decreased a tension between current pro¯ts and the
incentives of a ¯rm to deviate arises. If beliefs of the cartel members are strong enough, they
will vote against a proposal to lower the quota. In contrast, the latter model takes a slightly
more direct approach by assuming that cartel members face a psychological cost to having their
quotas reduced because of perceived property rights. Then in a simple bargaining model, the
result readily follows.
To conclude the paper, we argue that the story we have told throughout the paper is part
of a seemingly more general phenomenon. As discussed in the introduction, the current paper
has given an interesting example of an asymmetric reaction to news. In particular, we argued
that the primary reason for this result is because bargaining behaviour is in°uenced by the
business cycle. From this standpoint, our analysis shares some similarities with the literature
on union-¯rm negotiations and strikes. Indeed, there are many studies which point to more
frequent strikes during economic booms but with a signi¯cantly shorter duration than during
recessions; see for example Kennan [1985], Kennan and Wilson [1989], Harrison and Stewart
[1989] and Card [1988, 1990], among others. However, as in the present paper, this literature
has also not provided a satisfactory theoretical explanation of the data. In our minds, the nicest
explanation makes use of the Coase conjecture. However, even this explanation relies on the
assumption that commitment is more di±cult when demand is high.
Finally, if one takes our behavioural model as an accurate description of OPEC, one can
also see similar examples of entitlement e®ects distorting bargaining outcomes. For example,
Bazerman [1985] has argued that reference points play an important role in wage arbitration.
Zajac [1995] also argues that the status quo is a strong reference point in certain situations and
that feelings of entitlement to the status quo are often more important than notions of fairness.
Entitlements are also at play in issues of taxation and the provisions of the welfare state. It
is not often that a politician will win an election promising to scale back health-care, pensions
and other social programmes while at the same time raising taxes. However, as Romer [1996]
and Boeri, BÄ orsch-Supan, and Tabellini [2001] economics and demographics may soon require
such changes. These authors also argue that a strong preference for the status quo has held up
18major reforms, which though not Pareto superior, would be more e±cient and sustainable.
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20Appendix 1 - Figures
Figure A-1: Oil Price Fluctuations
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The purpose of this appendix is two-fold. We ¯rst conduct another robustness check. In particu-
lar, we use our empirical methodology to brie°y examine the impact that OPEC announcements
have on oil prices and re¯ners. The idea is the following - ¯rst, we should see a similar pattern
of abnormal returns when studying oil prices as we do in our analysis of oil companies. Second,
regarding re¯ners, we should see a weaker e®ect, and, moreover, reductions in the quota should
no longer lead to positive abnormal returns. We then proceed to discuss Saudi Arabia's role
within OPEC. Its prominence within OPEC and its vast reserves means we should take small
pause to analyse it.
2.1 Oil Prices and Re¯ners
Oil Prices
As we have emphasised in the main text, the relationship between oil companies and OPEC is
largely through oil prices. That is, OPEC's actions in°uence the price of oil, which, in turn a®ects
the pro¯tability of an oil company. We expect a similar pattern of cumulative abnormal returns,
though the e®ect need not be the same.28 In particular, crude oil is a storable resource; thus
when information arrives which would tend to push up oil prices, ¯rms may have the incentive
to draw down on their stocks, thus muting any price increase to some extent. Similarly, when
information pointing to lower prices arrives, ¯rms may take it as an opportunity to build up
stocks, with a similar dampening e®ect. Thus, although we expect a similar pattern, it would
not be surprising if the magnitude and signi¯cance of any events is somewhat weaker.
Our analysis is for the spot price and the two-month forward price of West Texas Intermediate
crude oil. As can be seen in the ¯gures below, we have a virtually identical pattern of abnormal
returns. Towards the end of the event window, we have positive cumulative abnormal returns
for quota reductions, and these are signi¯cant for the two-month forward price. While the CAR
functions for status quo announcements are not signi¯cantly negative, in both cases, we are able
to say that they are signi¯cantly below the CAR functions for reductions in the quota. Finally,
the CAR function for announcements of increases in the quota is never signi¯cantly di®erent
from zero. Thus we have that the pattern of returns follows closely to that reported in the main
text, though with somewhat weaker e®ects.
[Figure A2-1 Here]
Re¯ners
We also consider the impact of OPEC announcements on re¯ners. For lack of an index of
all re¯ners, we consider instead two of the larger North American re¯ners - Valero and Sunoco.
Importantly, these companies also have a signi¯cant retail marketing business and so we must be
careful in our analysis. We might expect status quo announcements to be the best news. That is,
the market calls for a reduction in crude oil production but OPEC fails to accommodate, leading
to a reduction in prices. First, the status quo announcement will put downward pressure on their
input prices, which should increase pro¯tability. Second, to the extent that these companies
have retail marketing operations the work of Borenstein and Shepard [1996] and Lewis [2003]
pointing to asymmetric price movements may come into play, leading to even higher pro¯ts from
lower prices.
As can be seen from the ¯gures, we have positive abnormal returns for quota reductions
and negative abnormal returns for status quo announcements. This is consistent with our
interpretation that the market is surprised by such announcements. However, it seems contrary
28We modify the estimation a little here. In particular, we consider Rit = ®+²it as our normal returns model (see
Campbell et al [1997] for more details). In addition our normal returns estimation period is taken to be 150 days
and the event window is 15 days before and after the event date.
25to the predicted pattern of returns. Indeed, the ¯gures for Valero look much the same as for the
oil indices considered in the main body. The pattern of returns for Sunoco is more consistent
with our predictions. In particular, quota reductions seem to be met somewhat negatively.




It has been suggested that Saudi Arabia acts as a swing producer and, in some sense, insures
other OPEC members against large swings in demand. Indeed, given Saudi Arabia's prominence
within OPEC we feel it important to take a separate look at it. Attention in the popular press
would seem to indicate that insurance is the ¯rst place one should look. However, under the
hypothesis that Saudi Arabia insures OPEC members, it would appear that disagreement is
not due to rent-seeking but rather the belligerence of Saudi Arabia. Thus let us dispel these
concerns. Assume that Saudi Arabia does, in fact, insure other OPEC members. Then we would
expect to ¯nd a positive correlation between the quota and Saudi Arabia's share of the quota.
With the data at hand, it is a simple enough task to obtain such correlations. However, we
must proceed cautiously since Saudi Arabia was able to increase dramatically its share of the
quota during the ¯rst Persian Gulf War because it was the only OPEC member with adequate
spare capacity. Thus, we divide our sample into two separate periods. The ¯rst includes the
period up to and including 1990, while the second includes the period from 1992 until 2002.
Visually, one can see in Figure A-4 how Saudi Arabia's share of the quota moves with the
overall quota. From the graph, it does not appear that the correct, under the null hypothesis,
correlation emerges. However, we endeavour to be slightly more formal. In the table below we
report the results of two regressions of Saudi Arabia's share on the total OPEC quota.
[Table 2 Here]
As the reader can see, for each time period, we are able to reject the null hypothesis of
zero correlation in favour of the hypothesis of negative correlation between the quota and Saudi
Arabia's share at least at the 5% level of signi¯cance. Thus we can reject the hypothesis that
Saudi Arabia acts as an insurer and can be much more satis¯ed with the ¯rst of our models in
Section 5. Note also that the negative correlation also holds if we run the regressions in terms
of ¯rst di®erences, though the t-statistics drop slightly.
26Figure A2-1: CAR Function For Oil Prices
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27Appendix 3 - Tables
Table 1: Wilcoxon Signed Rank Tests
Index Q" Q$ Q#
Oil Companies 0.1328 -2.3357 0.2365
Integrated Companies 0.9492 -1.8174 0.4438
Service Companies -1.8433 -2.1414 0.1587
Exploration Companies -1.1954 -1.9988 0.6706
Table 2: Test of Insurance Hypothesis
Regressors 1986-1990 1992-2002
Total OPEC Quota -0.000281 -0.0003122
(-5.80)** (-2.87)*
Constant 33.62 40.60
Number of Observations 12 17
R-Square 0.77 0.24
* | signi¯cant at 5%
** | signi¯cant at 1%
28Table 3: Abnormal Returns For Oil Companies Sub-Index
Event Q" Q" Q$ Q$ Q# Q#
Day ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR
-20 0.0018 0.0018 0.0021 0.0021 0.0007 0.0007
-19 -0.0021 -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0021 -0.0021 -0.0014
-18 -0.0023 -0.0025 0.0015 0.0036 0.0026 0.0012
-17 -0.0008 -0.0034 -0.0017 0.0018 -0.0038 -0.0026
-16 0.0022 -0.0012 -0.0005 0.0014 0.0003 -0.0023
-15 -0.0008 -0.002 -0.0006 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.004
-14 0.0011 -0.0009 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0067 0.0027
-13 -0.0027 -0.0036 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0055 0.0082
-12 -0.0016 -0.0052 -0.0029 -0.0044 -0.0043 0.0039
-11 0.0033 -0.0019 -0.0003 -0.0047 0.0002 0.0041
-10 -0.0034 -0.0053 0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0024 0.0018
-9 -0.0009 -0.0062 -0.0026 -0.0047 0.0043 0.0061
-8 -0.0058 -0.0119 -0.0014 -0.0061 0.0007 0.0068
-7 0.001 -0.0109 -0.0004 -0.0065 -0.0003 0.0064
-6 0.0032 -0.0077 -0.003 -0.0095 0.0011 0.0076
-5 -0.0013 -0.009 -0.0017 -0.0112 0.0046 0.0122
-4 -0.0049 -0.0139 0.0026 -0.0086 0.0012 0.0134
-3 0.0028 -0.0111 -0.0031 -0.0117 0.0019 0.0153
-2 -0.0017 -0.0128 -0.0005 -0.0122 -0.0004 0.0149
-1 -0.0003 -0.0131 0 -0.0122 -0.002 0.0129
0 0.0069 -0.0061 0.0008 -0.0114 -0.0024 0.0105
1 0.0013 -0.0049 -0.002 -0.0134 -0.0035 0.007
2 0.0032 -0.0017 0.0018 -0.0115 0.0018 0.0088
3 -0.0016 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0143 0.0016 0.0104
4 0.0047 0.0014 -0.0017 -0.016 0.0029 0.0133
5 -0.0018 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0162 -0.0011 0.0122
6 0.0046 0.0041 -0.0022 -0.0183 0.0048 0.017
7 -0.0018 0.0024 -0.0008 -0.0192 -0.0019 0.015
8 -0.0042 -0.0019 0.0004 -0.0187 -0.0053 0.0097
9 0.0017 -0.0002 0.0007 -0.018 0.0018 0.0116
10 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0205 0.0018 0.0134
11 0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0233 -0.0073 0.0061
12 0.0017 0.0016 0.0022 -0.0212 0.0001 0.0062
13 -0.0022 -0.0007 -0.0017 -0.0228 0.004 0.0102
14 0.0046 0.0039 0.0006 -0.0223 0.006 0.0163
15 0.0015 0.0054 -0.0016 -0.0238 0.0064 0.0227
16 0.0021 0.0075 0.0003 -0.0235 -0.0018 0.0209
17 -0.0016 0.0059 -0.0013 -0.0249 0.004 0.0248
18 -0.0009 0.005 -0.0004 -0.0252 -0.0006 0.0242
19 -0.0003 0.0047 -0.001 -0.0263 0.0039 0.0281
20 -0.0003 0.0044 0.0007 -0.0255 0.0037 0.0318
29Table 4: Abnormal Returns For Exploration Companies Sub-Index
Event Q" Q" Q$ Q$ Q# Q#
Day ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR
-20 0.0034 0.0034 0.0016 0.0016 0.002 0.002
-19 0.0013 0.0047 0 0.0016 -0.0034 -0.0014
-18 -0.0026 0.0021 0.0005 0.0022 0.0053 0.0039
-17 -0.001 0.0012 0.0009 0.003 -0.0033 0.0006
-16 -0.0036 -0.0024 0.0003 0.0033 0.0029 0.0035
-15 -0.0007 -0.0031 0.0004 0.0037 0.002 0.0055
-14 0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0003 0.0035 0.0068 0.0123
-13 -0.0006 -0.0021 -0.0004 0.003 0.0062 0.0185
-12 -0.0016 -0.0037 -0.0046 -0.0015 -0.0034 0.015
-11 0.0004 -0.0033 0.0005 -0.001 -0.0009 0.0142
-10 -0.0025 -0.0058 0.002 0.001 -0.0009 0.0133
-9 0.0007 -0.0051 -0.0021 -0.0011 0.0049 0.0182
-8 -0.002 -0.0071 -0.0004 -0.0015 0.001 0.0192
-7 -0.0015 -0.0086 -0.0005 -0.002 0.0027 0.0219
-6 0.0008 -0.0078 -0.0035 -0.0055 0.0007 0.0226
-5 -0.0009 -0.0087 -0.0003 -0.0058 0.0063 0.0289
-4 -0.0052 -0.0139 0.0002 -0.0055 -0.0031 0.0258
-3 0.0013 -0.0126 -0.0045 -0.0101 0.0021 0.0279
-2 0.0016 -0.0109 -0.0005 -0.0105 0.0032 0.0311
-1 -0.0024 -0.0133 -0.0028 -0.0133 -0.0004 0.0307
0 0.0065 -0.0068 0.0014 -0.0119 -0.004 0.0268
1 0.0027 -0.0041 -0.0026 -0.0145 -0.0009 0.0258
2 0.003 -0.0011 0.001 -0.0135 0.0046 0.0305
3 -0.0025 -0.0036 -0.0027 -0.0162 0.0028 0.0333
4 0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0039 -0.0201 0.0039 0.0372
5 -0.0014 -0.0036 0.0008 -0.0192 0.0009 0.0381
6 0.0024 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0205 0.007 0.0451
7 -0.0009 -0.0021 0.0005 -0.02 -0.0013 0.0438
8 -0.0054 -0.0075 0.0012 -0.0188 -0.0022 0.0416
9 -0.0001 -0.0076 -0.0023 -0.0211 0.0005 0.042
10 -0.0003 -0.0079 -0.0041 -0.0251 -0.0011 0.0409
11 -0.0016 -0.0095 -0.0051 -0.0303 -0.0037 0.0372
12 0.0002 -0.0094 -0.0001 -0.0303 -0.0019 0.0353
13 -0.0029 -0.0123 -0.0014 -0.0318 0.0028 0.0381
14 0.0025 -0.0098 0.0004 -0.0314 0.0072 0.0453
15 -0.0003 -0.0101 -0.0022 -0.0335 0.01 0.0553
16 0.0001 -0.01 0.0018 -0.0318 0.0002 0.0554
17 -0.0001 -0.0101 -0.0027 -0.0344 0.0036 0.0591
18 -0.0016 -0.0117 -0.0004 -0.0349 -0.0006 0.0584
19 -0.0014 -0.0131 0.0014 -0.0334 0.0024 0.0608
20 -0.0016 -0.0147 -0.0005 -0.034 -0.0016 0.0592
30Table 5: Abnormal Returns For Service Companies Sub-Index
Event Q" Q" Q$ Q$ Q# Q#
Day ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR
-20 0.0023 0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0016 0.0066 0.0066
-19 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0024 -0.004 -0.0021 0.0045
-18 -0.0019 0.0003 0.0031 -0.0009 0.0034 0.0079
-17 -0.0031 -0.0028 -0.002 -0.0029 -0.0051 0.0027
-16 -0.0012 -0.0039 0.0006 -0.0023 0.0043 0.007
-15 -0.0061 -0.0101 0.0019 -0.0005 -0.0029 0.0041
-14 0.0004 -0.0096 -0.0005 -0.001 0.0121 0.0162
-13 -0.0038 -0.0134 -0.0027 -0.0037 0.0086 0.0248
-12 -0.0082 -0.0216 -0.0028 -0.0065 -0.007 0.0178
-11 0.001 -0.0207 -0.0014 -0.0079 0.0072 0.025
-10 -0.003 -0.0237 0.0044 -0.0035 -0.0061 0.0188
-9 -0.0002 -0.0238 -0.0036 -0.0071 0.0014 0.0202
-8 -0.0099 -0.0337 -0.0042 -0.0113 0.0022 0.0224
-7 0.0009 -0.0329 0.0024 -0.0089 -0.0057 0.0167
-6 0.0024 -0.0304 -0.005 -0.0139 -0.0005 0.0162
-5 -0.0018 -0.0323 -0.0008 -0.0147 0.0112 0.0274
-4 -0.0095 -0.0418 0.0016 -0.0131 0.004 0.0314
-3 0.0021 -0.0397 -0.0033 -0.0164 0.0051 0.0365
-2 -0.0031 -0.0428 -0.0044 -0.0208 0.0059 0.0424
-1 -0.0024 -0.0452 -0.0063 -0.0271 -0.008 0.0344
0 0.0084 -0.0369 0.0046 -0.0225 -0.0044 0.0301
1 -0.001 -0.0379 -0.0053 -0.0278 -0.0109 0.0192
2 0.0057 -0.0322 -0.0031 -0.031 0.0068 0.0261
3 -0.0019 -0.0341 -0.0033 -0.0343 0.0047 0.0308
4 0.003 -0.0311 -0.0014 -0.0357 0.0071 0.0379
5 -0.0085 -0.0395 0.0007 -0.035 -0.0029 0.0351
6 0.0026 -0.0369 -0.0037 -0.0387 0.008 0.0431
7 0.0006 -0.0363 -0.0012 -0.0399 -0.0114 0.0317
8 -0.0105 -0.0467 -0.0005 -0.0404 -0.0062 0.0254
9 -0.001 -0.0477 0.0009 -0.0394 -0.0024 0.023
10 -0.0031 -0.0509 -0.0018 -0.0413 -0.0037 0.0194
11 -0.0017 -0.0526 -0.0057 -0.0469 -0.0108 0.0085
12 0.0051 -0.0475 0.002 -0.0449 0.0023 0.0108
13 -0.0031 -0.0506 -0.0011 -0.046 0.0051 0.0159
14 0.0057 -0.0449 0.0024 -0.0436 0.0107 0.0266
15 0.0017 -0.0432 0.0002 -0.0433 0.0163 0.0429
16 0.0003 -0.0429 -0.0001 -0.0434 -0.0018 0.0411
17 -0.0055 -0.0485 -0.0029 -0.0464 -0.0014 0.0397
18 -0.0054 -0.0539 0.0022 -0.0442 -0.0035 0.0362
19 -0.0005 -0.0544 0.003 -0.0412 0.0046 0.0408
20 0.0002 -0.0542 -0.0004 -0.0416 0.0006 0.0413
31Table 6: Abnormal Returns For Integrated Companies Sub-Index
Event Q" Q" Q$ Q$ Q# Q#
Day ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR ¹ ²¤ CAR
-20 0.0009 0.0009 0.003 0.003 -0.0008 -0.0008
-19 -0.0037 -0.0028 0.0003 0.0033 -0.0018 -0.0026
-18 -0.0019 -0.0047 0.0013 0.0046 0.002 -0.0006
-17 -0.0005 -0.0052 -0.0022 0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0039
-16 0.0048 -0.0005 -0.0009 0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0051
-15 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0025 -0.0075
-14 0.0011 0.001 -0.0009 -0.0001 0.0049 -0.0027
-13 -0.0033 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0018 0.0045 0.0018
-12 -0.0004 -0.0027 -0.0021 -0.0039 -0.0035 -0.0017
-11 0.0046 0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0042 -0.0001 -0.0018
-10 -0.0036 -0.0017 0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0022 -0.0039
-9 -0.0014 -0.0031 -0.0026 -0.0045 0.0045 0.0005
-8 -0.006 -0.0091 -0.001 -0.0055 0.0003 0.0009
-7 0.0016 -0.0076 -0.0009 -0.0064 0.0001 0.0009
-6 0.0039 -0.0037 -0.0027 -0.0091 0.0012 0.0021
-5 -0.0011 -0.0048 -0.0023 -0.0115 0.0024 0.0045
-4 -0.0041 -0.0089 0.003 -0.0084 0.0018 0.0063
-3 0.0033 -0.0055 -0.0024 -0.0108 0.0011 0.0074
-2 -0.002 -0.0075 0.0004 -0.0104 -0.0025 0.0049
-1 0.0011 -0.0064 0.0018 -0.0086 -0.0014 0.0034
0 0.0068 0.0004 0 -0.0086 -0.001 0.0024
1 0.0012 0.0016 -0.0015 -0.01 -0.0026 -0.0002
2 0.0028 0.0044 0.0029 -0.0072 0 -0.0002
3 -0.0016 0.0028 -0.0025 -0.0097 0.0007 0.0005
4 0.006 0.0088 -0.0012 -0.0109 0.002 0.0025
5 -0.0001 0.0087 -0.0006 -0.0115 -0.0017 0.0008
6 0.0051 0.0138 -0.0023 -0.0138 0.0033 0.0041
7 -0.0024 0.0114 -0.0007 -0.0144 -0.0003 0.0038
8 -0.0022 0.0091 0.0004 -0.0141 -0.0055 -0.0017
9 0.0027 0.0118 0.0017 -0.0124 0.0033 0.0016
10 0.0001 0.012 -0.0024 -0.0147 0.0036 0.0053
11 0.0015 0.0134 -0.002 -0.0168 -0.0072 -0.0019
12 0.0016 0.015 0.0025 -0.0142 0 -0.0019
13 -0.0018 0.0132 -0.0017 -0.0159 0.004 0.0021
14 0.0044 0.0176 -0.0001 -0.016 0.0049 0.007
15 0.0023 0.0199 -0.0017 -0.0177 0.0036 0.0106
16 0.003 0.0229 -0.0003 -0.018 -0.0025 0.0081
17 -0.001 0.0218 -0.0007 -0.0186 0.005 0.0131
18 0.0004 0.0222 -0.0009 -0.0196 0.0004 0.0135
19 -0.0003 0.0219 -0.0023 -0.0219 0.004 0.0175
20 -0.0001 0.0218 0.0012 -0.0207 0.0056 0.0231
32